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h i g h l i g h t s
 The first multi-vector gas and power system analysis for Ireland is performed.
 Power system security is vulnerable to outages on the gas network.
 Economic operation of the power system is negatively affected by gas network outages.
 Excessive power system reserve allocation can occur over a transmission constraint.
 Wind forecast error results in large utilisation swings for importing gas pipelines.
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a b s t r a c t
Gas fired generation currently plays an integral support role ensuring security of supply in power systems
with high wind power penetrations due to its technical and economic attributes. However, the increase in
variable wind power has affected the gas generation output profile and is pushing the boundaries of the
design and operating envelope of gas infrastructure. This paper investigates the mutual dependence and
interaction between electricity generation and gas systems through the first comprehensive joined-up,
multi-vector energy system analysis for Ireland. Key findings reveal the high vulnerability of the Irish
power system to outages on the Irish gas system. It has been shown that the economic operation of
the power system can be severely impacted by gas infrastructure outages, resulting in an average system
marginal price of up to €167/MW h from €67/MW h in the base case. It has also been shown that gas
infrastructure outages pose problems for the location of power system reserve provision, with a 150%
increase in provision across a power system transmission bottleneck. Wind forecast error was shown
to be a significant cause for concern, resulting in large swings in gas demand requiring key gas infrastruc-
ture to operate at close to 100% capacity. These findings are thought to increase in prominence as the
installation of wind capacity increases towards 2020, placing further stress on both power and gas sys-
tems to maintain security of supply.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Due to the mass adoption of renewable energy, specifically
wind in EU member states, the importance of gas fired generation
is continually highlighted [1]. One of the driving factors behind
large scale renewable integration is the pursuit of increased secu-
rity of supply [2]. While the installation of renewables reduces reli-
ance on imported fossil fuels in the long term, the high penetration
of stochastic energy sources such as wind results in challenges for
real time power system operation [3,4]. In markets with high pen-
etrations of wind power, gas fired generation has been responsible
for maintaining system supply and demand balance, accounting for
the residual demand not fulfilled by wind and reacting to sudden
changes in wind output. Wind power has been shown to gain fuel
mix share at the expense of gas fired generation resulting in large
decreases in gas unit capacity factors [5]. However, the resulting
decline in capacity factor does not attribute less importance on
gas plant, but signals a paradigm shift in electricity market opera-
tion [6].
The increasing support role fulfilled by gas and the uncertain
supply profile required as a result of high penetrations of wind
power are apparent in the flows of gas in pipeline infrastructure
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.10.150
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supplying gas units. It has been shown that variations in gas gen-
erator outputs are passed directly onto the existing gas infrastruc-
ture [7]. Uncertainty in the quantity of gas required to fuel a
generator in order to participate in the electricity market poses a
major problem for gas shippers by casting uncertainty over pipe-
line capacity nominations and re-nominations, as well as increas-
ing their exposure to network balancing penalties [8]. Gas
transmission system operators are also impacted, requiring to
operate the system close to pressure margins in order to maintain
adequate system pressure and ensure domestic customers are pri-
oritised. Increased variability results in increased operational costs
due to compressor usage in an effort to deliver gas where it is
needed, since the transport time for gas in a pipeline is much
longer than that of electricity over a transmission line [7].
In power systems with both high penetrations of gas fired gen-
eration and wind power, the importance of gas infrastructure (i.e.
gas pipelines supplying power stations and compressor installa-
tions maintaining network pressure) for system security and oper-
ation is further heightened. This is especially true in the Single
Electricity Market (SEM) of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and
Northern Ireland (NI). Analysis in [9] showed that gas supply inter-
ruptions to power generation on the island of Ireland ranging from
1 to 90 days could cost between 0.1 and 1 billion euro per day.
Combined with domestic load losses, the cost of gas supply inter-
ruption was forecasted to be upwards of 80 billion euro.
While the interaction of flexible generation capacity in support
of renewable energy has been well studied [10,11], research on the
effects and role of gas infrastructure on power systems with high
renewable penetrations has been relatively limited. A review of
the recent research in the field shows that much of the work has
focused on developing new integrated gas and electricity models
and applying the optimisation to test networks. In [12], a security
constrained unit commitment (SCUC) model incorporating gas
transmission constraints was developed and applied to a six bus
power system and a seven node gas system. Several scenarios were
analysed, including the impacts of gas transmission constraints,
gas pipeline outages and varying natural gas loads. Further analysis
of the SCUC model was conducted using a 118 bus power system
and a 14 node gas system to show the effectiveness of the proposed
model. It was found that gas transmission constraints resulted in
higher daily operating costs than the case with no gas transmission
constraints. In addition, variations in gas load as well as gas pipe-
line infrastructure failures negatively impact system security and
results in large levels of load shedding. A similar SCUC model
was presented in [13] to assess the relationship between gas pipe-
line outages and power system security. It was found that imple-
menting a suitable fuel switching strategy in affected zones
prevented some unit shutdowns. However, the overall system load
shedding was directly related to the number of gas units unable to
receive fuel. A co-optimisation planning model considering the
relationship between gas and power infrastructure was presented
in [14], where the ability of gas infrastructure expansion to trans-
port the required fuel to the power system was considered in the
iterative planning approach.
A comprehensive overview of gas and power system security
dependence is given in [15]. Again, a SCUC model is used to illus-
trate the importance of gas infrastructure on a test system contain-
ing renewable sources. However, this is the only work to consider
the impact gas pipeline outages have on the locational marginal
price, noting a large increase due to congestion in affected zones
as a result of gas generators being forced off. A pumped storage
plant placed in the zone with highest demand was found to be a
suitable alternative to load shedding in times of gas pipeline
outages.
A fully representative model of the Great Britain (GB) gas and
power system was developed and presented in [16]. Combined
optimisation of both networks was conducted for a winter month.
Outages of key pieces of gas infrastructure such as terminals and
storage and their effects on compressor use, network line pack,
gas shedding and generation by fuel type were illustrated. Low
pressure on the gas network was shown to negatively affect the
ability of gas generators to contribute electricity supply. Large
levels of gas shedding were apparent, accounting for the large
increase in combined system operation costs. The work highlighted
the importance of multiple supply routes and the ability of gas
storage to compensate for supply failures by reducing load shed-
ding. Further development of the above model in order to consider
the impacts of high wind power penetration on the Great British
gas network in 2020 was presented in [7]. Low and high wind sce-
narios were compared to the 2009 base case, which resulted in
higher and lower total operational costs respectively. It was shown
that when high gas demand and low wind occurred together, the
gas network was placed under stress and saw a rapid depletion
in line pack which impacted on the ability of gas generators to
run. These variations require more compressor use and thus result
in increased system operational cost. Gas storage was offered as a
solution, as well as hourly instead of daily line pack balancing.
Reliability of the combined GB gas and power system during a
winter week in 2020 was investigated in [17]. The gas and power
co-optimisation model presented in [16] was coupled with a
Monte Carlo simulation to determine the reliability of the com-
bined networks. Uncertainties regarding supply, demand and
infrastructure for both power and gas networks were considered.
The multi-vector energy system approach to reliability assessment
was shown to be a possible asset when considering future invest-
ment decisions. A £900 million decrease in expected energy
unserved as a result of a doubling gas storage capacity was illus-
trated. The impact of various deterministic and stochastic unit
commitment and economic dispatch strategies to deal with uncer-
tainties in wind power forecasts were analysed in [18]. The test
system consisted of the GB gas and electricity networks. Day ahead
and within day dispatch instructions resulting from stochastic
methods are shown to deal with the variation in wind power better
than the deterministic method, achieving a saving of 1% in total gas
and power system operational costs.
All of the above work has developed an integrated gas and
power model and applied it to either a test system or the GB sys-
tem. Power system operational impacts have not been fully inves-
tigated as a result of gas infrastructure outages, with the above
research focusing mainly on gas consumption, load shedding, fuel
mix changes and stochastic methods not currently used by the sys-
tem operators in Ireland. Instead, this research focuses on the
impact gas infrastructure outages have on system operational met-
rics such as the price of electricity, capacity utilisation and gas
pipeline flows in a high wind power system where gas supplies
are mainly imported and the use of gas storage is limited. This
paper is presented as follows. Section 1 introduces the subject mat-
ter and establishes the state-of-the-art. Section 2 describes the
choice of the test system, modelling methodology and key assump-
tions utilised in the analysis. Section 3 provides results and discus-
sions regarding key results including power systemmarginal price,
unit commitment impacts, gas infrastructure flows and the effect
wind forecast error has on gas infrastructure operation. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2. Methodology
Due to the high penetrations of natural gas fuelled generating
units and installed wind capacity, the SEM was chosen as the test
system. A winter week in 2011 was used since the available data
from both gas and power system operators enabled clear validation
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to be performed. In 2011, gas fuelled generators contributed 56% of
electricity demand throughout 2011 [19]. The importance of gas
fired generation and therefore gas infrastructure is further com-
pounded when the large installed capacities of renewable sources,
particularly wind, is considered. Total installed wind capacity in
the SEM in 2011 was 2278 MW.
Both gas and power models were built using Energy Exemplar’s
PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model Version 6.3 [20] and solved with
the FICO Xpress Optimisation Suite solver [21]. PLEXOS minimises
the objective function shown in Eq. (1) subject to the constraints in
Eqs. (2)–(12) to deliver a dispatch instruction representative of the
least cost solution for both power [22,23] and gas systems.
minRt2TRj2JRi2I
SCj  USjt þ NLCj  UGjt
þ VOMj þ UOSj
 
:Pjt
þPCj  Pjt
þPenLLE  UEEt þ PenLLE  RESjt
þPDE  ExEt
þGPCit þ PenLLG  UGDt
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
ð1Þ
Subject to
Rt2TRj2J Pjt  Ploadjt þ UEEt
  ¼ EDt ð2Þ
Pjt  Pjt1 MRUj  UGjt 6 0 ð3Þ
Pjt  Pjt1 MRDj  UGjt P 0 ð4Þ
Pjt  Pmaxj  UGjt 6 0 ð5Þ
Pjt MSLj  UGjt P 0 ð6Þ
Rt2TRi2I GProdit þ UGDtð Þ ¼ GDt ð7Þ
GFVitGFPit P 0 ð8Þ
GPVkt MaxPVkt 6 0 ð9Þ
GPVkt MinPVkt P 0 ð10Þ
GPFkt MaxPFkt 6 0 ð11Þ
GPFkt MinPFkt 6 0 ð12Þ
where t signifies the time period index from t to T, SCj is the cost to
start unit j subject to the binary multiplier determining if unit j has
started in the current period. The no load cost of unit j is repre-
sented by NLCj coupled with a binary value UGjt determining if unit
j is generating or not. Additional costs relating to unit j’s short run
marginal cost such as variable operation and maintenance charges,
use of service charges, production costs and power output in period
t are denoted by VOMj, UOSj, PCj and Pjt respectively. Any unserved
electrical energy in the system at time t, UEEt, and reserve not met
by unit j in period t, RESjt is priced at the penalty for loss of electrical
load, PenLLE. The penalty for dumped energy is represented by PDE
and the quantity of excess energy in time t is ExEt. Gas system pro-
duction costs from field i at time t are represented by GPCit.
Unserved gas demand at time t, UGDt, is priced at the penalty for
loss of gas demand, PenLLG. Pump load performed by unit j at time
t is given by Ploadjt and electrical system demand is represented by
EDt. Upper boundaries on ramp up and down rates of unit j are
denoted by MRUj and MRDj respectively. The maximum and mini-
mum generation levels attributable to unit j are represented by
Pmaxj and MSLj respectively. Gas production is symbolized by
GProdit, with GDt representing total system gas demand at time t.
Production from each gas field GFPit must not violate the volume
of gas in the field, GFVit. Pipeline constraints representing the gas
transportation algorithm are shown in (9)–(12). The volume and
flow in pipeline k in each time period t are GPVkt and GPFkt respec-
tively. These parameters are bounded by maximum and minimum
volumes MaxPVkt, MinPVkt, and flow rates MaxPFkt MinPFkt
respectively.
2.1. Single electricity market
The SEM in 2011 operated as a gross mandatory pool market,
with generating units submitting bids corresponding to their short
run marginal cost (SRMC) i.e. the cost corresponding to generating
one additional MW [24]. The price of electricity in each 30 min per-
iod is set at the most expensive generator’s SRMC which is dis-
patched to meet demand. This system marginal price (SMP) is
determined on an unconstrained ex-post basis. For all dispatched
generators with a SRMC lower than the SMP in each period, the dif-
ference is deemed infra-marginal rent and enables profit to be
made, hence short run costs are used in the bidding process [25].
Constraint and capacity payments are made outside of the market,
and are not considered in this analysis.
Total thermal capacity for the winter week was 8856 MW, and
is shown by fuel type in Table 1 [26]. Average generating unit char-
acteristics by fuel type are also shown in lieu of individual unit
characteristics for the sake of brevity. Unit specific data is available
publically via the verified regulator model available in [27]. A peak
system demand of 4599 MWwas experienced. All generators were
assumed to be available for dispatch, with no forced or planned
outages included in the analysis in an effort to attribute generation
shortages as a function of gas pipeline availability. A single gas
generator in the neighbouring GB electricity market was modelled,
with a scaled level of installed wind in order to achieve the vali-
dated interconnector flows over the Moyle interconnector, linking
both markets.
Average hourly power demand, wind forecast, wind generated
and wind curtailment data for the week modelled are shown in
Fig. 1.
2.2. Market modelling
In an effort to achieve a fully realistic representation of the SEM,
the overall simulation is split into two main parts consisting of a
market operator and a system operator. Both parts are run with a
24 h look ahead, a step size of one day and an interval length of
one hour. An overview of the simulation is shown in Fig. 2.
Table 1
Installed thermal capacity.
Fuel Installed capacity (MW) Average maximum capacity (MW) Average minimum stable level (MW) Average ramp up (MW/min)
GAS ROI 3692 247 105 9
GAS NI 1518 152 72 3
COAL ROI 855 285 99 3
OIL ROI 804 115 27 1
COAL NI 476 238 93 6
PEAT ROI 345 115 51 1
DISTILLATE ROI 324 54 15 5
DISTILLATE NI 316 45 9 9
PUMPED STORAGE ROI 292 73 5 210
HYDRO ROI 216 14 5 5
WASTE ROI 17 17 3
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2.2.1. Market operator
The SEM market operator model manages the economic side of
dispatch, forecasting and calculating the overall SMP. It does not
consider system constraints. Within the market operator, two runs
are carried out to model the SEM as a single node. The ‘‘Ex-Ante 1”
model is run with a 24 h wind forecast, day ahead of real time with
a 24 h look ahead. This serves to create an indicative SMP and unit
schedule, as well as the scheduling of interconnector flows. The
Ex-Ante 1 model in the simulation is formulated as a direct imple-
mentation of the SEM market scheduling and pricing software
methodology set out in the trading and settlement code [24]. The
second run for the market operator model is the ‘‘Ex-Post” model.
The results from this run report the actual SMP for each trading
period, and utilises the market schedule quantities from the sys-
tem operator model, with no wind forecast applied. In this analysis,
the overall economic conclusions due to gas infrastructure outages
are arrived at using the Ex-Post model.
2.2.2. System operator
For the system operator part of the simulation, the model is run
in interleaved mode. This results in both constituent models being
ran at the same time, feeding generation quantities and prices back
and forward for a more accurate solution. The system comprises of
two nodes, NI and ROI. A single tie line connects both nodes, with a
transfer capacity from North to South and South to North of
450 MW and 400 MW respectively. Both models ran in the system
operator section are inclusive of transmission constraints and
reserve requirements. A reserve and security constrained unit
commitment model (‘‘RCUC/SCUC”) is the lead day ahead model
utilising interconnector flows from the Ex-Ante 1 Model and a
24 h wind forecast. A wind forecast standard deviation of error cor-
responding to 13% [28] was applied to the actual wind generation
data used in the dispatch quantity model run to create the day
ahead wind profile. The dispatch quantity model (‘‘DQ”) uses all
of the same scenarios as the RCUC/SCUC, but includes no wind
forecast error which corresponds to actual available wind genera-
tion for each time step [29]. This ensures that an accurate market
schedule quantity (MSQ) is created, with the quantities of genera-
tion being confined to the constraints of the actual transmission
system from an operational and system security point of view.
The results of the DQ model run are then used by the Ex-Post
model for the completion of the simulation.
2.3. All Island gas network
Unlike the SEM, where the jurisdictions of NI and the ROI are
operated as a single system, the gas network comprises 3 jurisdic-
tions (NI, ROI, and GB) and has four separate transmission network
codes in operation [30]. Both regulatory bodies on the island of
Ireland, Utility Regulator in NI and the Commission for Energy
Fig. 1. Hourly average power and wind profiles.
Fig. 2. Model schematic.
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Regulation in ROI signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2008
towards developing a single gas network with the aim of comply-
ing with the European Single Internal Energy market [31]. Work on
the common arrangements for gas is still ongoing.
The gas transmission network modelled in this analysis is
shown in Fig. 3, with major load centres and power stations high-
lighted [32]. In 2011, there were two entry points to the system.
Indigenous production from the Kinsale gas fields off the coast of
Cork enter the system through the Inch terminal, point 1 in
Fig. 3. This is also the location of the only gas storage facility for
the Irish system, using a depleted gas field to supplement seasonal
demand [33]. The volumes experienced through the terminal at
Inch are in decline due to the gas fields reaching their end of life.
This location is thought to grow in prominence as a storage facility
in future. Over 95% of All Island gas demand was met through
imports from the Moffat entry point during 2011, point 2 in
Fig. 3 [34]. Moffat supplies the ROI system via two subsea intercon-
nectors, Interconnector 1 and Interconnector 2 (IC1 and IC2),
whereas the entirety of NI’s gas demand is supplied via the Scotland
Northern Ireland Pipeline (SNIP) that connects to the onshore
Scotland IC1 network at Twynholm and enters the NI system at
Carrickfergus. It is possible for NI to receive gas from ROI and vice
versa using the South North Pipeline (SNP). The North West
Pipeline (NWP) supplies gas to the Coolkeeragh combined cycle
turbine, and is able to receive gas from the SNP directly and the
SNIP via the Belfast Gas Transmission Pipeline (BGTP). Key infor-
mation regarding the importing pipelines used in the analysis is
shown in Table 2, and maximum nodal entry and exit capacities
are shown in Table 3 [35,36].
The gas model is integrated with the power system model via
the gas fired generating units. A gas transportation algorithm is
employed to supply demand at receiving nodes. Pressure and pipe-
line hydraulics are not modelled, resulting in an energy flowmodel
optimised concurrently with a unit commitment and economic
dispatch power model, the formulation of which is detailed in Sec-
tion 2. Gas demand for the non-power sectors was obtained
directly from Gas Networks Ireland, and located at the appropriate
nodes. No compressors are modelled at above ground installations
in the analysis.
2.4. Line pack
Line pack is an important characteristic of gas transmission sys-
tems, enabling gas infrastructure to exhibit inherent storage capa-
bility and manage large fluctuations in demand. This is achieved by
ensuring the pressure in the pipeline is above that of delivery pres-
sure at exit nodes on the system [37]. Despite the gas transporta-
tion algorithm dealing in terms of energy flows, inclusion of line
pack via maximum and minimum pipeline volumes serves as a
proxy for pressure limitations in the model. Pipeline characteristics
shown in Table 2 coupled with maximum and minimum pressure
limits from [38,39,40] were used to calculate the line pack in each
pipeline modelled.
Average pressure in each pipeline, accounting for differences in
upstream and downstream pressures was calculated using Eq. (13)
where P1 and P2 are the upstream and downstream pressures
respectively.
Pavg ¼ 23 P1 þ P2 
P1P2
P1 þ P2
 
ð13Þ
Line pack was then calculated via Eq. (14), assuming an average
compressibility factor, Zavg of 0.9 [41].
Vb ¼ 7:855 104 TbPb
 
Pavg
ZavgTavg
 
D2L ð14Þ
where Tb, Tavg are base and average temperatures respectively. For
the onshore Scotland Interconnector pipeline system, a 30 km sec-
tion of the network is twinned. Therefore, an equivalent diameter
for use in Eq. (14) was calculated using Eqs. (15) and (16) consider-
ing both pipe diameters and lengths, D1, D2, L1, L2 respectively.
Dequivalent ¼ D1 1þ ConstConst
 2
5
ð15Þ
where:
Const ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
D1
D2
 5 L2
L1
 s
ð16Þ
2.5. Gas transmission tariffs
Gas transmission tariff arrangements in NI and the ROI operate
on different charging regimes [42]. In NI, a ‘‘postalised” tariff policy
on gas transmission is implemented. This policy results in a single
1 
2 
NTS 
SNIP 
NWP 
Inch 
IC1 
IC2 
SNP 
Belfast
Derry
Dublin
Cork
Galway
Waterford Gas 
Coal 
Peat 
Pumped 
Hydro Energy 
Fig. 3. Gas transmission network.
Table 2
Gas transmission design and operational parameters.
Pipeline Diameter
(D, mm)
Length
(L, km)
Maximum pressure
(kPa Gauge)
Minimum pressure
(kPa Gauge)
IC1 600 204 14,800 5000
IC2 750 195 14,800 5000
SNP 450 156 8500 3000
SNIP 600 135 7500 5600
NWP 450 112 3500 2700
Inch 610 53 2950 1900
Table 3
Nodal constraints.
Node Max flow (TJ/d) Node type
Moffat 1231 Entry
Twynholm 321 Entry
Carrickfergus 107 Exit
Gormanstown 202 Exit
Inch 226 Entry
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tariff payment regardless of the final destination of the transported
gas on the NI portion of the system. The postalised tariff is com-
prised of a capacity charge regardless of utilisation to cover fixed
infrastructure costs, and a commodity charge levied on the volume
of gas transported to cover variable infrastructure costs. The capac-
ity commodity split is 75/25 [43].
In the ROI system, an entry-exit tariff structure is employed for
interconnection and offshore pipelines, with a postalised onshore
tariff applied [42]. This enables booking of capacity at entry and
exit points to be conducted independently. Additionally, different
prices are applied at entry and exit points in order to signal system
status and promote effective use of the network. The capacity com-
modity split on the ROI system is 90/10 [43]. Commodity charges
from Moffat and Inch are priced differently in the analysis. It was
decided to utilise the gas commodity transportation adders avail-
able in [44] to allocate tariffs on the modelled interconnection
points. A similar approach is used for the SNIP pipeline. These
transportation costs were deducted from the total price of gas
input to the validated model. This is to ensure gas price parity
between the validated model and the developed model used in this
analysis. Capacity charges were not included, since generators par-
ticipating in the SEM are prevented from bidding in any more than
their short run costs [45]. All capacity utilised in the simulation is
assumed to be long term purchased capacity on pipelines, the cost
of which is not permitted to be recovered from short run costs. It
was assumed nonetheless that the capacity commodity split was
applied on a 50/50 basis between entry and exit, resulting in a sin-
gle commodity charge applied on all relevant entry and exit points
on the system.
2.6. Scenarios
In the main analysis, a base case and four gas outage scenarios
(NTS, SNIP, NWP and Inch) are evaluated in order to determine the
resiliency of the current gas infrastructure to supply power
demand in times of unexpected outages. Therefore, key sections
of pipeline were chosen to achieve this result. The NTS scenario
corresponds to a failure of the single pipeline from Twynholm to
Brighouse Bay compressor station in the onshore Scotland system.
This then renders both subsea interconnectors (IC1 and IC2) down
for the duration of the simulation. In the SNIP scenario, a failure on
the subsea SNIP pipeline is assumed, forcing all of NI demand to be
met by the South-North pipeline via IC2. Two further smaller
impact scenarios were also modelled to assess the ability of the
onshore Ireland system to respond to outages. The NWP scenario
involved an outage on the section of pipeline towards Derry, cut-
ting supplies to domestic demand in the city and requiring the
404 MW Coolkeeragh power station to remain offline. Finally, loss
of the offshore pipeline connecting the Inch entry point is assumed
in the Inch scenario. With the loss of this pipeline, the ability for
storage utilisation is removed. The timeframe of one week was
decided upon as it corresponds to a conservative estimate on the
length of time required to repair a gas pipeline [46].
Additionally, the impact of wind forecast error is included as a
sensitivity analysis for each of the outage scenarios. The inclusion
of this sensitivity enables the measureable impact of wind power
on the nomination requirements of shippers and in turn, the oper-
ation of gas transmission infrastructure to be achieved.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Power system marginal price
The influence of the NTS pipeline on power system operation is
the largest impact on systemmarginal price (SMP), and is shown in
Fig. 4. Average SMP in the NTS scenario is above the base case in
every hour. As expected, at peak times, the price of electricity rises
extremely quickly as the increased load and constrained genera-
tion system struggles to keep the system secure. During the NTS
scenario, a price cap of 1000 €/MW h corresponding to the value
of lost load is reached six times, all around peak time reflecting
the system’s lack of next megawatt generation by online plants.
The average peak time fuel mix is shown in Fig. 5. The influence
of expensive generating plants such as oil and distillate at peak
time, combined with their overall increase in generation output
are the reason for such high prices during the day, especially at
peak time. This shows that by losing the IC system, consumers
would be seriously negatively impacted due to having to pay very
high prices.
The impacts each of the other scenarios have on SMP are shown
in Fig. 6, with average SMP and operational costs shown in Table 4.
It can be seen that the loss of the Inch pipeline does not have any
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Fig. 4. Hourly SMP NTS scenario.
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significant effect on the SMP, tracking the base case SMP closely.
However, by forcing all ROI gas flow through the cheaper IC sys-
tem, a small decrease in operational cost is realised. It is envisaged
that the saving in operational costs as a result of the Inch pipeline
outage would not be achievable in the longer term, since the Inch
node storage entry point is lost during the Inch outage. The ability
to hedge against seasonal gas price variations in the GB gas market
would therefore be lost, and the impact of this hedging would be
captured over a longer simulation horizon, resulting in an antici-
pated increase in combined system operational costs for the Inch
scenario.
The most interesting finding is due to the loss of the SNIP, which
results in a lower average price experienced, despite a higher peak
price at 17:00. This is due to the 2.2% increase in cheaper coal fired
units output over the week at off peak times, and an increase in oil/
distillate plant output at peak time. The increase in combined sys-
tem operational cost is attributable to the use of oil and distillate
plant at these peak times. The increase in coal unit output by inclu-
sion in the merit order is due to the increased gas transportation
costs to all gas fired units in NI. The increase in transportation cost
is a result of gas flows via the IC and SNP rather than directly
through the single postalised SNIP tariff, placing NI units further
down the merit order, enabling increased coal NI generation.
The loss of the NWP results in a higher average price, higher
peak price and higher total system operational cost than the base
case although not as high as the SNIP case since only the Coolkeer-
agh unit is affected in the NWP scenario. This enables the other gas
fired generating units in NI to contribute supply as they are fuelled
by the SNIP and are not eliminated from the merit order due to
increased gas transportation costs, reflecting the base scenario
rather than the SNIP scenario. The increased output from gas units
in NI over the timeframe delivers a larger SMP than the base and
SNIP scenario. However, the NWP results in a similar total opera-
tional cost reported for the base case since the output of oil and
distillate is much lower than that experienced in the SNIP scenario.
Overall, excluding the NTS scenario, the peak time generation mix
does not undergo significant change between scenarios, with small
changes having noticeable effects on the SMP but less pronounced
effects on system operational costs.
3.2. Unit commitment and reserve provision
Fig. 7 shows the difference in generation output by fuel type
between each scenario and the base case. The total output from
gas, coal and oil units in the system shows the largest variation
over all scenarios studied.
As reserve provision is directly proportional to the availability
and unit commitment status of the generating unit, the reserve
provision is analysed concurrently with generation output. The
percentage change in reserve provision by major fuel type per sce-
nario is shown in Fig. 8.
When the NTS pipeline supplying both IC1 and IC2 is removed,
gas generation in the ROI experiences a large decline in output
from 1300 GW h to 360 GW h. This decline is countered by large
increases in generation from gas and coal units in NI and ROI,
respectively. Oil and Distillate ROI units also show increases in out-
put, the only scenario in which this is the case. The shift in gener-
ation between ROI and NI during NTS outage is shown when
considering the differences in flow over the North South tie line.
The time averaged tie line utilisation percentage is shown in
Fig. 9. It is evident that a dramatic change in the utilisation of
the tie line occurs as a result of decreasing gas unit availability in
ROI. The tie line is utilised at near to full capacity for the duration
of the NTS scenario in the NI–ROI direction (negative values in
Fig. 9), whereas the average transfer occurring in the base scenario
does not achieve such high levels of tie line utilisation.
During the NTS scenario, the ability of the ROI gas units to con-
tribute supply is severely limited. Therefore, their contribution to
system reserves is similarly affected. This can be seen from
Fig. 8, where ROI gas units reserve provision decreases by 12%. In
an effort to maintain system security and satisfy demand, ROI coal
Table 4
Average SMP and combined operational costs.
Scenario Average SMP
(€/MW h)
Combined system operational
costs (000’s €)
Base 67.11 26,350
Inch 68.06 26,327
NTS 168.71 40,812
NWP 72.12 26,603
SNIP 64.56 29,625
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units are scheduled on to a higher level than in the base case. This
results in a large decrease in the ability of coal units to provide
reserve, as they are primarily dispatched for maintaining supply.
Responsibility for reserve provision is transferred to units in NI,
who show a large increase of over 150%. Although this is an accept-
able solution from the viewpoint of the simulation, the ability of
such an increase in reserve across the ROI/NI tie line is not neces-
sarily an acceptable measure in real time system operation. The
main reason for this concern is the transmission line constraint
linking both jurisdictions. During 2011, the transfer capacity from
North to South and South to North was 450 MW and 400 MW
respectively. During the NTS scenario, the north south tie line
was running at full capacity in the north south direction 95.2% of
the hours studied. This placed 104 GW h of required reserve on
the NI node where only approximately 25% of system demand is
located. This would not be prudent system operation since if the
reserve held in NI was required in the ROI, the capacity constraints
on the ROI/NI tie line would not permit the required level of trans-
mission to maintain system security. Other notable changes in
reserve provision originated from peat generation, which saw an
increase of 30% in the NTS scenario.
Loss of the Inch terminal has a limited effect on the running of
gas units, surprisingly including those close to the reception facil-
ities in the Cork area. Generation for these units actually increased
from 428 GW h to 432 GW h on account of the cheaper gas avail-
able from the interconnector system as a result of the onshore
postalised tariff. The loss of this pipeline also shows that storage
withdrawal during winter is not a critical concern to gas system
operation when other pipelines are in full operation. However,
when considering the fact that over 95% of gas supplies are
imported through Moffat, the lack of impact Inch terminal has on
gas and power system operation is understandable. Reserve provi-
sion for the major load suppliers, gas and coal, are relatively unaf-
fected. This is by and large due to the ability of lost supply being
compensated by increased flows from Moffat. However, peat has
again shown its ability to contribute reserve in times of disruption.
Use of peat generation in this capacity is encouraging, since secu-
rity of supply concerns area allayed due to indigenous fuel
production.
The loss of the NWP pipeline leads to the loss of the 404 MW
Coolkeeragh gas fuelled plant. As a result, it is more economical
to dispatch large gas and coal units in the ROI that are already
online, rather than starting the second of two coal plants in NI.
The reluctance of the simulation to commit a further coal unit in
NI due to the cost minimisation objective function employed is
illustrated in Tables 5 and 6. It can be seen that despite the defi-
ciency in generation output in NI, average unit commitment across
the week for coal units remains unchanged, with a decrease in the
quantity of online capacity not dispatched. However, it is clear that
both gas and coal units located in ROI are utilised much more effi-
ciently than the base case, given their similar average units com-
mitted, generation and undispatched capacity.
The loss of the SNIP had the largest cumulative effect on system
reserve provision. A decrease in gas generation reserve provision
actually resulted in a large increase in coal NI provision, which
is the opposite of the NTS scenario. Coal NI exhibits more
undispatched capacity due to an increase in average units commit-
ted, accounting for both the increased generation and increased
reserve provision. Utilisation of the ROI gas units in the SNIP case
is not as efficient as in the loss of NWP, since the units committed
are the same, but undispatched capacity is increased despite rela-
tively no change in reserve provision. The large decrease in gas NI
generation is due to the increased costs associated with transport-
ing gas over the IC system and through the SNP pipeline, with
increases in gas ROI achieved due to the increased cost
competitiveness.
The most interesting finding considering reserve and generation
relates to the utilisation of peat units. Peat shows virtually no
change across all scenarios with regards to generation. However,
peat units are key providers of reserve for both NTS and Inch sce-
narios. This is attributable to their must run status due to their use
of an indigenous fuel source. As can be seen from Table 7, peat
units are almost committed in every time period across all scenar-
ios, with variations in reserve attributable to the economic
dispatch.
3.3. Gas interconnector flows
Since the scenarios utilised in this analysis involve forced
outages on key pieces of gas infrastructure, it is beneficial to anal-
yse the impacts each of the outage events has on the rest of the
system. In order to maintain clarity, it was decided to present
the scenarios in two distinct sub groups, one comparing NI pipeline
outages with the base case and one comparing ROI outages. These
can be seen in Figs. 10 and 11 respectively.
For NI pipeline outages, loss of the NWP and the large Coolkeer-
agh generator supplied does not significantly influence the total
system line pack. Lower levels of line pack at 5 am and 6 am high-
light the ability of the Coolkeeragh unit to contribute early morn-
ing generation due to being constrained on due to a system
operational constraint with a high minimum stable level in the
base case. However, when approaching peak demand, the levels
of line pack in this scenario are close to those found in the base
case. The most interesting finding of the line pack analysis is
regarding the network situation on losing the SNIP pipeline. A large
increase in line pack at 6 am and 3 pm occurs in anticipation of
peak demand. The ability of line pack to reach such high levels is
due to the large entry capacity of the IC system, accounting for
the lack of imports through SNIP. However, when NTS is on outage,
the smaller capacity SNIP coupled with the higher tariff for use
results in gas line pack being significantly depleted and the change
being made to run extra coal units in lieu of ROI gas units. This can
be demonstrated by comparing the flow differences in each pipe-
line for each of the main system delivery scenarios, NTS, SNIP
and Inch, shown in Fig. 12.
Table 5
Unit commitment.
Base NWP SNIP
Average units committed
GAS ROI 0.62 0.65 0.65
COAL ROI 0.83 0.95 0.94
GAS NI 0.23 0.38 0.15
COAL NI 0.52 0.52 0.78
Table 6
Undispatched capacity.
Base NWP SNIP
Average undispatched capacity (MW)
GAS ROI 420 421 482
COAL ROI 211 221 239
GAS NI 85 93 46
COAL NI 38 34 42
Table 7
Peat plant utilisation.
Base Inch NTS NWP SNIP
Average undispatched capacity
(MW)
9.37 10.45 10.41 8.84 10.01
Average unit commitment 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
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The peaks in line pack due to the outage on SNIP are directly
attributable to the flows imported along the ROI subsea system
via the NTS pipeline. Both Figs. 12 and 13 show that not only does
overall volume across NTS increase in the SNIP scenario, but the
time averaged flow across the IC system is also in strong agree-
ment with the levels of line pack reported. With the loss of SNIP,
system balancing is solely the responsibility of the NTS pipeline,
showing an increase of 619 TJ across the week. A very small
increase in supply from Kinsale is realised, the level of which does
not contribute line pack or network balancing improvements since
storage is withdrawing at or near its maximum capacity in all
scenarios.
The line pack changes due to outages on the Inch pipeline do
not show a great deal of variation from the base case. The loss of
Inch results in slightly more total system line pack due to larger
imports over the IC system in order to maintain system balance.
As shown previously, gas generation does not alter significantly
in this scenario, enabling larger levels of line pack to be achieved
by forced import through a large capacity node. However, with
the loss of the major IC subsea system, gas imports are focused pri-
marily on maintaining domestic load, resulting in large decreases
in gas generation. All imports in the NTS scenario are made
through the smaller capacity SNIP entry therefore line pack levels
are significantly depleted. The lowest levels of line pack found
occur in this scenario, indicating the most stress applied to the
gas system due to low pipeline pressures throughout the network.
Similarly, in the case of NTS outage, the level of imports across
the SNIP IC show the most significant change in all IC scenarios
studied. The smaller capacity SNIP shows a large increase in flows,
from 51% utilisation in the base case to 97% as a result of NTS out-
age. However, this increase in utilisation is not enough to restore
line pack to the levels seen in the base case, further highlighting
the levels of stress on the gas network in an effort to maintain both
gas and power system security. While the overall line pack situa-
tion in the outage of SNIP may seem acceptable and follow a
well-defined daily profile, the utilisation of a single piece of infras-
tructure to near full capacity is a concern.
3.4. Wind forecast error
Fig. 14 shows the percentage difference in gas entry pipeline
flows between the RCUC/SCUC and DQ models for each scenario.
The only difference in each of these scenarios is the application
of wind forecast error, which corresponds to 13% standard devia-
tion of errors applied to the RCUC/SCUC model. In the base case,
the only significant change occurs on the NTS pipeline, where the
wind forecast error results in a 3.7% increase in flow for the DQ
model which represents close to real time wind generation. In
the Inch outage scenario, the 1.5% increase in flows required by
lack of wind generation in NI via SNIP has accompanied a large
swing in flow required in the IC system decreasing by over 5%.
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The largest change in RCUC/SCUC and DQ flows due to wind
generation occurs when the NWP pipeline is on outage. Both the
SNIP and NTS lines experience increases of 3% and 6.5% respec-
tively. The NWP pipeline effects a relatively small change in overall
flows, representing a low stress gas system which is more suscep-
tible to wind variability induced gas nomination changes. In con-
trast, during the NTS outage, the SNIP pipeline operates at near
100% capacity over 50% of the time periods analysed. Therefore,
the ability of wind to effect change on this high utilised pipeline
is minimised since the main stress of the pipeline is supplying
demand regardless of wind. In a less stressed state, the necessity
to supply demand is much less, presenting an opportunity for the
effect of wind forecast error to be accentuated. This is also applica-
ble in the Inch case. However, the ability of the SNIP pipeline in the
Inch scenario to supply fast acting gas generation in the event of a
significant drop in wind power is severely limited. This would pre-
sent a significant problem for the system operators, as lack of flex-
ibility on the system to respond to high ramp up in residual
demand could lead to significant level of load shedding on the sys-
tem. In addition, large swings in gas demand for power generation
assets negatively impact the shippers involved in the purchase of
gas unit fuel. Uncertainty around fuel requirements and lack of
available well developed storage infrastructure on the island of Ire-
land increase the risk profile of gas unit operation. Large swings in
wind generation ultimately increase the vulnerability of gas unit
operators to the spot market instead of long term fuel contracts,
directly impacting on the ability to operate the gas plant in the
most economical fashion. As can be seen from the SMP results in
Section 3.1, this uncertainty over gas flows and infrastructure oper-
ation is directly passed onto consumers.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, the ability of the natural gas transmission infras-
tructure to influence the operation of the power system has been
well illustrated. Additionally, the resiliency of the gas transmission
system to maintain supply in times of key infrastructure failures
has also been demonstrated. The test system for this analysis
was the all island gas and power system in Ireland. This case study
proved interesting on three levels. Firstly, the high level of gas fired
generation units enhanced the importance of gas infrastructure on
power system security. Secondly, lack of indigenous production
and well developed storage infrastructure implies that the over-
whelming majority of gas supplies have to be imported from the
GB system. Finally, the high penetration of wind power and the
well understood wind/gas relationship further pressures the gas
transmission system infrastructure to respond quickly to residual
demand, placing the system in intermittent high stress operation.
The influence of wind forecast error due to the high penetration
of wind power was also investigated.
The key findings of the investigation all reveal the vulnerability
of the Irish gas system due to the emphasis placed on power sys-
tem security. The economic operation of the power system is
severely impacted when the single pipeline supplying both of the
ROI subsea interconnectors is on outage, resulting in an average
SMP of € 169/MW h. The value of lost load in the SEM is hit over
50% of the periods analysed. This scenario also impacts on the
power system’s ability to respond to sudden changes in demand,
wind related or otherwise, due to increasing the reserve provision
in NI by over 150%. This reserve provision locates the system secu-
rity across a power system transmission bottleneck, which causes
serious concern as a result of possible gas pipeline outages.
Wind forecast error also has a significant impact on gas trans-
mission infrastructure, requiring increased flexibility due to the
operation of gas fired generation. Again, losing the key subsea
system presents another significant issue to both gas and power
system operators as the SNIP pipeline in NI operates at near
100%. Any further variability in wind generation or unexpected
plant outage resulting in a rapid change in power system status
would therefore not be served by gas fired generation further
increasing the risk profile of the system. These risks are thought
to be applicable to other systems with high fossil fuel import
dependency and high gas and wind power penetrations. Future
work will develop a fully representative GB and Ireland gas and
power model. This will enable the interactions of combined sys-
tems and markets to be fully investigated.
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